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Twenty-five years ago, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered a
thought-provoking lecture entitled Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality
in Relation to Roe v. Wade.' One of her central points was that Roe v. Wade
"sparked public opposition and academic criticism" partly because the Court
"presented an incomplete justification for its action." 2 The Court's decision
located a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy solely in "a concept of
personal autonomy derived from the due process guarantee" 3 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, rather than also in the then-emerging sex-equality
jurisprudence of the Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. By doing so, the
Court both set itself up for academic criticism of the type that has generally
accompanied substantive due process decisions-namely, that the Court has
simply imposed its own value preferences-and framed the right in negative-
liberty terms that contributed to its restrictive view in later cases involving
such issues as access to abortion for poor women. But at the same time that
Justice Ginsburg criticized the Court in Roe for not going far enough-by
failing to ground the right to terminate a pregnancy in both the autonomy and
equality prongs of the Fourteenth Amendment-she also suggested that the
Court "ventured too far in the change it ordered." 4 In going beyond simply
striking down the Texas statute to create a framework for state regulation that
focused on the stages of pregnancy, Roe implemented a "'kind of legislative
* Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law
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I The lecture, which was delivered on April 6, 1984, was later published as Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade,
63 N.C. L. REv. 375 (1985.).
2 Id. at 376.
3 Id. at 381.
4Id.
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code"' that mistakenly narrowed the constitutionally permissible choices
available to the states.5
In my contribution to this Symposium, I do not propose to revisit Justice
Ginsburg's argument with respect to Roe v. Wade and abortion rights. I am
fully convinced of her primary point: women can attain full equality only if
they can control their fertility, and access to abortion remains a critical
element of that control. Indeed, the Court itself has articulated that view. In
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,6 for
example, Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court stated that the
Constitution's "promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will
be kept largely beyond the reach of government... extends to women as
well as to men."'7 And in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,8 the joint opinion of
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter pointed to the fact that "[t]he ability
of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation
has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives" 9 and
that "[a]n entire generation has come of age free to assume Roe's concept of
liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society" as a reason to
reaffirm its central holding.' 0 Only by implicitly abandoning that view of
women as fully equal, and equally capable, citizens could the Court decide
Gonzales v. Carhart1I as it did: treating women as somehow too fragile to
make difficult choices regarding second-trimester abortions and reinstating
the gilded cage that Justice Ginsburg as a litigator did so much to
dismantle.12
This Essay focuses instead on the broader points Some Thoughts on
Autonomy makes about judicial method. First, I suggest that Justice
Ginsburg's performance on the Supreme Court reflects the principles she
identified in Some Thoughts on Autonomy. Justice Ginsburg has continued to
resist the temptation to use substantive due process as an occasion for
5 Id. at 382 (quoting Paul Freund, Storms over the Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A. J.
1474, 1480 (1983)).
6 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
7 Id. at 772.
8 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
9 Id. at 856.
10 Id. at 860.
11 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
12 For a thorough and thoughtful discussion of the Court's deployment of the
woman-protective rationale for limiting access to particular abortion techniques, see
generally Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics ofAbortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-
Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991; Reva B. Siegel, The Right's
Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion
Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008).
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"'specify[ing] by a kind of legislative code the one alternative pattern that
will satisfy the Constitution."" 13 And she has continued to see the
"intimat[e] ... practical" relationship between autonomy and equality in
adjudicating Fourteenth Amendment claims.' 4 Second, I suggest some limits
to Justice Ginsburg's hypothesis that a "stereoscopic" view of the Fourteenth
Amendment can do much to dampen popular backlash against Supreme
Court decisions.
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND JUSTICE GINSBURG'S RESISTANCE
TO THE NEW SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Substantive due process has become so identified with Roe v. Wade and
other cases involving intimate decisionmaking and autonomy that most
constitutional law scholars have hardly noticed that the most significant
innovation in substantive due process during the Rehnquist and Roberts
Court years has involved a very different sort of decisionmaking altogether:
namely, the imposition of punitive damages by juries in tort cases. In Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 15 the Supreme Court, after several years
of searching for a doctrinal handle, held that the Due Process Clause imposes
a substantive limit on the size of punitive damages awards. 16 The Court
subsequently clarified that "grossly excessive" or disproportionate punitive
damages awards violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 17
Initially, a majority of the Justices rejected the idea of an objective test
for unconstitutional disproportionality. 18 And yet, within a few years, the
Court ended up adopting precisely such an approach. In B.M W of North
13 Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 382 (quoting Paul Freund, Storms over the Supreme
Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 1474, 1480 (1983)).
14 Id. at 375.
15 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
16 See id. at 17-18 (stating that, although the common-law method of imposing
punitive damages is not "per se unconstitutional," a particular award can be reviewed for
reasonableness under the Due Process Clause).
17 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993) (opinion of
Stevens, J.).
18 See id. at 457-58 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by the Chief Justice and
Blackmun, J.) (rejecting the idea that objective factors could be combined into an
objective "test"); id. at 466-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting the
idea of a constitutional inquiry that focuses on the amount of the award in favor of one
that looked at the jury's reasoning); id. at 470-72 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (rejecting the entire enterprise of constitutional
proportionality review).
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America v. Gore,19 the Court identified a set of "guideposts" for assessing
whether a punitive damages award is unconstitutionally high. 20 The second
of these guideposts was what the Court called "ratio" 21-the mathematical
relationship between the amount of compensatory damages the jury had
awarded and the amount of punitive damages it had imposed.22 "The
principle that exemplary damages must bear a 'reasonable relationship' to
compensatory damages" 23 suggested that a "breathtaking" ratio between the
two should "surely 'raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.' ' 24 In Gore, the
Court declined to identify a precise point at which judicial brows and lungs
would seize up.25 But in State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Campbell,26
although the Court repeated its "reluctan[ce] to identify concrete
constitutional limits on the ratio," it offered something only a little less rigid
than concrete: "[I]n practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will
satisfy due process." 27 And last Term, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,28 an
admiralty case in which the Court deployed federal common law rather than
constitutional law to review a punitive damages award, the Court declared its
skepticism of "verbal formulations," 29 rejected "the notion that judges cannot
use numbers," 30 and declared that a 1:1 ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages formed "a fair upper limit" in (some) admiralty
cases.
31
Justice Ginsburg is the only Justice to have dissented in all three of the
ratio cases. And her grounds for dissenting echo her critique of Roe's
19 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
20 Id. at 574-75.
21 Id. at 580.
22 Id. at 581.
23 Id. at 580.
24 Id. at 583 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 481 (O'Connor, J. dissenting)).
25 See Gore, 517 U.S. at 582.
26 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
2 7 Id. at 424-25.
28 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
2 9 Id. at 2628.
30 Id. at 2630. Oddly, the Court pointed to the twenty-one-year period in the rule
against perpetuities as an example of judges using numbers; the way of calculating that
period is notoriously complex. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 690 (Cal. 1961)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (holding, because the rule against perpetuities is such
a "technicality-ridden legal nightmare" and so "fraught with ... confusion," that a lawyer
who made a mistake in drafting a will could not be held liable for malpractice).
31 Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2633.
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"codification" of abortion rights.32 In BMW v. Gore, her dissent, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, began by noting that the Court had embarked on the
process of nationalizing and constitutionalizing limits on punitive damages
"in the face of reform measures recently adopted or currently under
consideration in legislative arenas." 33 And she ended with an appendix
containing an account of the variety of controls on punitive damages
"enacted or under consideration in the States," including "(1) caps on
awards; (2) provisions for payment of sums to state agencies rather than to
plaintiffs; and (3) mandatory bifurcated trials with separate proceedings for
punitive damages determinations." 34 Her point was straightforward. In
response either to their own perceptions of a problem or to the Court's more
tentative forays into controlling punitive damages in Haslip and TXO, states
had adopted or were considering an array of different responses. It would
therefore be a mistake for the Supreme Court to short-circuit this process and
announce a single "'pattern that will satisfy the Constitution. '35
Compare that discussion in BMW v. Gore with Justice Ginsburg's
description of the legal landscape at the time of Roe: the "political process
was moving" and "majoritarian institutions were listening and acting."36 A
"distinct trend in the states"37 towards reform was preempted by "[h]eavy-
handed judicial intervention." 38 The critiques are of a piece with one another.
In State Farm, where the Court announced a presumptive upper limit of
10:1 on punitive damages, Justice Ginsburg's dissent was equally
straightforward in condemning the legislative character of the Court's
constitutional holding:
In a legislative scheme or a state high court's design to cap punitive
damages, the handiwork in setting single-digit and 1-to-I benchmarks could
hardly be questioned; in a judicial decree imposed on the States by this
Court under the banner of substantive due process, the numerical controls
today's decision installs seem to me boldly out of order.39
Ultimately, even in the common-law context of federal admiralty at issue
32 See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 382.
33 Gore, 517 U.S. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 614.
35 Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 382 (quoting Paul Freund, Storms over the Supreme
Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 1474, 1480 (1983)).
3 6 Id. at 385.
3 7 Id. at 379.
38 Id. at 385.
39 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,40 Justice Ginsburg did question the Court's
handiwork in adopting a 1:1 ratio. She expressed skepticism as to "whether
there [was] an urgent need in maritime law to break away from the
'traditional common-law approach,"' under which punitive damages awards
were reviewed individually, in order to adopt an essentially legislative
solution. 41 One needn't go anywhere near as far as Robert Bork once
notoriously did in asserting that "the respective claims to pleasure" of
couples seeking to use contraceptives and corporations seeking to void
pollution ordinances "are identical" 42 to see that, having recognized the
virtues ofjudicial forbearance even in the area of substantive due process and
reproductive rights, it is hardly surprising that Justice Ginsburg insists on that
approach when it comes to substantive due process and purely economic
issues.
II. EQUAL AUTONOMY: JUSTICE GINSBURG AND THE
STEREOSCOPIC FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
This year marks not only Justice Ginsburg's seventeenth year on the
Supreme Court, but also the sixtieth anniversary of the Court's opinion in
Railway Express Agency v. New York.4 3 The case itself is little more than a
textbook example of just how far the Court will stretch to hypothesize a
permissible purpose in a rationality review case. What makes the case really
memorable, however, is Justice Jackson's concurrence, which advances a
powerful vision of the relationship between due process and equal protection:
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that
there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to
allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply
legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited
upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better
measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in
operation. 44
40 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
41 See id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 9 (1971).
43 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
44Id. at 112-13 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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I have written extensively elsewhere about the desirability of reading the
Fourteenth Amendment "stereoscopically"-that is, of understanding the
ways that principles of liberty and equality inform one another.45 Perhaps
none of Justice Ginsburg's opinions more clearly illustrates this technique
than ML.B. v. S.L.J.46
ML.B. concerned Mississippi's termination of a mother's parental rights.
After the state trial court ruled against her, M.L.B. filed a timely appeal.
State law, however, conditioned her right to appeal on prepayment of record
preparation fees of about $2400. Her application to proceed in forma
pauperis was denied, and her appeal was dismissed. 47
The Supreme Court reversed.48 Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court
recognized the case's location at the intersection of equal protection and due
process values:
The equal protection concern relates to the legitimacy of fencing out would-
be appellants based solely on their inability to pay core costs. The due
process concern homes in on the essential fairness of the state-ordered
proceedings anterior to adverse state action. A precise rationale has not been
composed, because cases of this order cannot be resolved by resort to easy
slogans or pigeonhole analysis.49
Justice Ginsburg also recognized that the Court's earlier litigation-access
cases had shoehorned the issue into an equal protection claim, but she clearly
inflected that doctrinal pigeonhole with autonomy-based considerations. 50
The reason for requiring states to waive access fees in parental termination
cases (as opposed to, paradoxically enough, bankruptcy cases, where the
government can restrict access to litigants able to pay a filing fee51) is that a
fundamental interest is at stake:
Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are
among associational rights this Court has ranked as of basic importance in
our society, rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the
45 See Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic
Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REv. 473 (2002); Pamela S. Karlan, Loving
Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1447 (2004).
46 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
47 See id. at 106-09 (recounting the facts and procedural history of the case).
4 8 Id. at 128.
49 ML.B., 519 U.S. at 120 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
50 1d. at 124-25.
51 See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445-49 (1973) (bankruptcy filing fees
pass rationality review under the Equal Protection Clause).
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State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect. M.L.B.'s case,
involving the State's authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond,
demands the close consideration the Court has long required when a family
association so undeniably important is at stake.52
Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in M.L.B. does more than
simply carry forward into another area of law her connection of autonomy
and equality. Rather, ML.B. echoes a related aspect of Justice Ginsburg's
analysis in Some Thoughts on Autonomy: the problematic character of
negative constitutional rights, particularly when it comes to the interests of
indigent women, and the need for equality-based reasoning to fill the gaps in
autonomy-based analyses. 53 Toward the end of Some Thoughts on Autonomy,
Justice Ginsburg pointed out that a purely autonomy-based abortion right
"places restraints, not affirmative obligations, on government.' '54 At the same
time, she recognized the problem with straightforward equal protection
arguments based on poverty: "Generally, constitutional claims to government
benefits on behalf of the poor have prevailed only when tied to another
bark. '55 In the context of abortion, Justice Ginsburg identified that associated
concept as the prohibition on gender-based discrimination.56 In ML.B., by
contrast, protection against gender-based discrimination cannot carry that
load. Even though there will be many cases where mothers find themselves
economically disadvantaged relative to fathers-as M.L.B. herself did in the
battle with S.L.J. to retain ties to their child-fundamental parental liberty
interests, and not gender equality, provided the stronger basis for protecting
M.L.B.'s access to the courts. In short, the government's affirmative "duty to
govern impartially" 57 can come from a fundamental liberty interest's
inflection of equal protection, just as it can come from an equality-based
inflection of a fundamental liberty interest.
There is one aspect of Some Thoughts on Autonomy with which I want to
express some reservations, doing so, to quote Justice Ginsburg's
characterization in the essay itself, "tentatively and with trepidation." 58
Precisely because Justice Ginsburg's analytic argument is so convincing, it is
clear that abortion implicates more than private choice. Supporters of
traditional gender roles were right to see abortion as a threat to maintaining
52 ML.B., 519 U.S. at 116-17 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
53 Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 384-85.
54 Id. at 384.
55 Id. at 384-85.
56 Id. at 385.
57 Id. (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 357 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
58 Id.
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the subordinated position of women. Traditionalists would, I think, hardly
have been neutralized-in 1973 or today-by a judicial opinion that relied
explicitly on the importance of reproductive control to women's equality.59
In other words, appeals to equality, rather than quieting the waters stirred up
by demands for autonomy, may actually roil them further, as they clarify the
connection between the exercise of particular rights and broader claims for
full personhood.
At the same time, as the current debate over the rights of gay people
shows, there paradoxically often seems to be more support for equality in the
workplace and political spheres-where members of different groups are
actually in direct competition with one another-than in the sphere of private
autonomy, which one might initially have thought of as involving non-
rivalrous goods. In this light, compare two of Justice Ginsburg's most
forceful dissents, both written during the 2006 Term. In Gonzales v.
Carhart,60 her dissent from a decision upholding a federal abortion statute
excoriated the majority for disrespecting a "woman's autonomy to determine
her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature" 61-reinforcing
her connection of autonomy and equality values-but it has had little effect
in changing the terms of the debate. By contrast, her equally vigorous dissent
in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 62 condemning her colleagues'
"cramped interpretation" of federal fair employment law and urging
Congress "to correct this Court's parsimonious reading of Title VII"6 3 bore
almost immediate fruit, culminating in the first major legislation signed by
President Obama.64
III. CONCLUSION
In her service on the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg has had the
opportunity to apply the principles she identified in Some Thoughts on
Autonomy to a broad range of issues. Her opinions show that although the
essay's immediate focus was reproductive rights and women's autonomy, its
59 Justice Ginsburg herself implicitly recognizes this point when she writes that "I
do not pretend that, if the Court had added a distinct sex discrimination theme to its
medically oriented opinion, the storm Roe generated would have been less furious." Id at
383.
60 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
61 Id. at 172 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
62 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
63 Id. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
64 See Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics
Divide, 89 B.U. L. REv. 539, 539-44 (2009) (discussing the role of Justice Ginsburg's
dissent in galvanizing political support for the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009).
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skepticism of free-ranging substantive due process claims and its embrace of
a stereoscopic approach to the Fourteenth Amendment have played out in a
consistent approach to some of the most controversial issues before the
Court.
